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SPECIAL ISSUE
SCIENCE IN THE FOREST, SCIENCE IN THE PAST
Mathematical traditions in Ancient Greece
and Rome
Seraﬁna CUOMO, Durham University
There were different ways of doing mathematics in the ancient Greek and Roman world. This essay will explore historiograph-
ical approaches to this diversity, from the claim that there were different traditions, to explorations of the social status of math-
ematicians, to attempts to go beyond written traditions in order to reconstruct practices. I will draw on Jean Lave’s studies on
situation-speciﬁc mathematics to try and tease out the power relationships and underlying assumptions behind different his-
tories of the evidence available to us.
Keywords: Hero of Alexandria, two cultures, pure mathematics, applied mathematics, code-switching, Lave
In his dialogue Republic, the fourth-century BCE Athe-
nian philosopher Plato laid the foundations for the idea
of two cultures in ancient Greek mathematics. While
discussing how best to educate the future leaders of
the ideal state, Socrates says:
It would be appropriate . . . to legislate this subject for
those who are going to share in the highest ofﬁces in
the city and to persuade them to turn to calculation
and take it up, not as laymen do, but staying with it
until they reach the study of the natures of the num-
bers by means of understanding itself, not like trades-
men and retailers, for the sake of buying and sell-
ing, but for the sake of war and for ease in turning the
soul around, away from becoming and towards truth
and being. (Plato, Republic 525b–527a, Loeb tr.; italics
mine)
Possibly drawing on Pythagorean ideas, Plato set up
a contrast on more than one level. Different ways of
doing mathematics corresponded to different expertise,
purpose, and people. Indeed, in another dialogue, the
Philebus, Plato has Socrates ask: “Are there not two
kinds of arithmetic, that of the many (oi polloi) and that
of philosophers” (Plato, Philebus 56d, modiﬁed Loeb
tr.)?
The term hoi polloi used here implies that one of the
essential features of the philosophers’ arithmetic is its
segregated, elitist character.
Fast forward a few centuries. Around 45 CE, the tem-
porarily exiled Roman senator and translator of Plato’s
Republic Marcus Tullius Cicero wrote:
With the Greeks, geometry was regarded with the ut-
most respect, and consequently none were held in
greater honour than mathematicians, but we Romans
have restricted this art to the practical purposes of mea-
suring and reckoning. (Cicero, Tusculanae Disputa-
tiones I.2, Loeb tr.)1
Mathematics is only one of the ways in which Greeks
and Romans differ, according to Cicero, but his charac-
terization has remained especially inﬂuential, shifting
Plato’s dichotomy toward a distinction on the basis of
“national” or “cultural” identity. To simplify a long
and complicated story, Plato and Cicero are signiﬁcant
milestones in the genealogy of the idea that there were
twomathematical cultures, or traditions, in classical an-
tiquity: one theoretical, the other practical; one aimed
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1. Similar sentiments appear in Horace, Epistulae II 3.323–
332.
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at general truths, the other at solutions to speciﬁc prob-
lems; one achieving persuasion through rigorous logical
proof, the other didactic and “algorithmic”; one inter-
ested only in knowledge, the other open to applications.
Prima facie, the idea of two mathematical traditions
appears to be supported by the textual evidence. There
is a relatively well-deﬁned group of texts, explicitly and
intertextually linked with each other, which has often
been identiﬁed as “mainstream” Greek mathematics:
Euclid’s Elements, most of Archimedes’s treatises, Apol-
lonius’s Conics, and so on. This tradition operates for
the most part within an axiomatico-deductive demon-
strative framework, which means that both its theo-
rems and its problems are formulated in general and
abstract terms. On the other hand, there is a sprawling
tradition of texts in Greek, arguably sometimes inter-
textually linked with texts in cuneiform languages, in
ancient Egyptian languages, in Latin, and possibly in
Arabic, which has been identiﬁed as “folk” or “practical”
mathematics, and consists of procedures for solutions
carried out on speciﬁc instances of a problem. It bears no
authenticated authorial identiﬁcation, although some of
it goes under the umbrella of pseudo-Heronian tradition
(Høyrup 1997).
Let us look at one example: the equivalence between
the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle,
and the sum of the squares on its cathetes (see Figure 1).
Today this equivalence (let’s call it P) is known as the
theorem of Pythagoras, even though the attribution to
Pythagoras, alleged to have lived in the sixth century
BCE, is not found in our sources until much later.
Euclid’s Elements, originally compiled around the early
third century BCE, contains P in the following form:
In right-angled triangles the square on the side sub-
tending the right angle is equal to the squares on the
sides surrounding the right angle.
Let ABC be a right-angled triangle having the angle
at BAC right. I say that the square on BC is equal to the
squares on BA and AC.
For let a square, the BDEC, be described on BC; on
BA and AC the squares GB and HC, and the AL have
been drawn through A parallel to either BD or CE, and
let AD and FC have been joined. And because each
of the angles at BAC and BAG are right, two straight
lines AC and AG, not lying on the same side, make
the adjacent angles with a random straight line BA
and a point A on it, equal to two right angles. Therefore
CA is on a straight line with AG. Because of these things
then also the BA is on a straight line with AH. And be-
cause the angle at DBC is equal to the angle at FBA, for
both are right angles, let the angle at ABC be added in
common. Therefore the whole angle at DBA is equal
to the whole angle at FBC. And because DB is equal
to BC, ZB to BA, and the two DB, BA to the two FB,
BC, respectively, and the angle at DBA is equal to the
angle at FBC, therefore the basis AD is equal to the basis
FC, and the triangle ABD is equal to the triangle FBC.
And the parallelogram BL is double the triangle ABD,
for they have the same basis BD and are between the
same parallels BD, AL. The square GB is double the tri-
angle FBC, for again they have the same basis FB and
are between the same parallels FB, GC. Therefore the
parallelogram BL is also equal to the square GB. Simi-
larly the AE, BK being joined, it will be proved that
the parallelogram CL is also equal to the square HC.
Therefore the whole square BDEC is equal to the two
squares GB, HC. And the square BDEC is described
on BC, while the squares GB, HC on BA, AC.
Therefore the square on the side BC is equal to the
squares on the sides BA, AC. Therefore in right-angled
triangles the square on the side subtending the right
angle is equal to the squares on the sides surrounding
the right angle. As it was necessary to prove. (Euclid,
Elements I.47; my translation)
Figure 1: Diagram for Euclid,Elements I 47, the so-called the-
orem of Pythagoras (free source: https://archive.org/details
/JL_Heiberg___EUCLIDS_ELEMENTS_OF_GEOMETRY
/page/n45).
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Euclid’s formulation can be taken as emblematic of
the “theoretical” tradition: it is axiomatico-deductive
in that it starts with a general statement, and then pro-
ceeds logically from undemonstrated premises and
from statements that have been proved earlier in the
Elements, to conclusions that, provided the reader has
agreed with the initial premises and with the “rules of
the game,” are logically necessary. Characteristically, it
deploys a lettered diagram.2
Now consider the following text, dating to the sec-
ond century CE:
Let there be a right-angled triangle with the vertical
side 3 feet long, the hypotenuse 5, ﬁnd the basis.
We will ﬁnd it like this.
The 5 multiplied by itself makes 25. And the 3 mul-
tiplied by itself makes 9. And from the 25 take away
the 9, the remainder is 16. Its root is 4. It will be the
basis: 4. Similarly too we will ﬁnd with other num-
bers. (P Geneva III 124 verso; my translation)
This text also sets off from a(n implicit) statement
of/that P, but is organized very differently from the
passage in the Elements: P becomes a means to solving
a problem rather than the focus of a proof; the text
deals with a particular case and speciﬁc measurements;
it appeals directly to the reader, taking them through a
sequence of steps and calculations (a sequence some-
times referred to in modern scholarship as an “algo-
rithm”), and it uses, as visible in the ﬁgure above, a
numbered diagram, where the key geometrical objects
of the problem are marked by a number expressing their
length or area.
These differences are what gives substance to the
idea of two cultures of Greek mathematics. Most re-
cently, Markus Asper has described them as follows:
1. Generalmathematicalknowledgeemerged fromprac-
tical mathematical knowledge.3 In Asper’s words,
“To think of [practical mathematics, ndr] as “sub-
scientiﬁc” makes sense, as long as one remembers
that our understanding of what science is has been
heavily inﬂuenced by Greek theoretical mathemat-
ics. The “sub” here should be taken literally: ancient
practical mathematical traditions were certainly all-
pervasive in ancient Greece, on top of which theo-
retical mathematics suddenly emerged, like a ﬂoat
on a river’s surface—brightly colored and highly
visible, but tiny in size”(Asper 2009: 114; italics in
original). This claim has some corollaries:
a) There is a sense in which, even though “it is
doubtful whether the notion of an abstract rule
was present behind all the actual procedures”
of practical mathematics (Asper 2009: 113),
the reiteration of procedures and the accumu-
lation of cases led toward understanding at a
general and abstract level;4
b) The emergence of the theoretical tradition from
the substratum of the practical tradition is a case
of Bourdieu-type social distinction (Asper 2009:
123–25). The theoretical tradition was a sort of
closed club, almost a “game” played by a small
group, who set their way of doing mathematics,
and consequently themselves, in contrast to the
larger groups engaged in practical mathematics.
The crucial context for thisBourdieu-type social-
distinction operation is, in Asper’s view, classical
Athens (ﬁfth and fourth centuries BCE). On this
view, the Plato we have cited at the beginning is,
as it were, channelling the Zeitgeist, rather than
creating ex novo the notion of a mathematics of
the kaloi kagathoi (“the ﬁne and the good”) and
one of hoi polloi.
2. The locus classicus on lettered diagrams is Netz (1999).
For the deductive structure of the Elements, see Mueller
(1981).
3. Asper: “Manipulating pebbles on an abacus can lead to
the discovery of general arithmetical knowledge” (2009:
108); “These two cases show how specialized, practical
knowledge could become abstract and move beyond the
circle of specialists” (109).
4. Asper: “The numbered diagram is meant to ‘ensure that
the reader understands the actual procedure and, thereby,
the abstract method’ ” (2009: 119, 122; in particular 110);
“Strangely, the method itself is never explained in general
terms, nor is its effectiveness proved. . . . Obviously, the
reader is meant to understand the abstract method by re-
peatedly dealing with actual, varied cases. The leap, how-
ever, from the actual case to the abstract method is never
mentioned in these texts. Learning a general method is
achieved in these texts by repeatedly performing a proce-
dure, understanding its effectiveness and memorizing the
steps by repetition” (111).
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2. By contrast with the theoretical tradition, which
thus has an inception point, the practical tradition
is presented as essentially ahistorical: its roots go
deep within Egyptian and Mesopotamian mathe-
matics and, looking forward, it continues within
Arabic mathematics. Despite some qualiﬁcations,
the terminology used by Asper (and others) to re-
fer to the persistence and stability of the practical
tradition implies that it remained to a large extent
unchanged.5
3. The people active within either culture were so-
cially distinct (this as a result but also a precondi-
tion of 1b, above). In particular, mathematicians
within the practical tradition, and possibly includ-
ing a greater portion of “foreigners” or “migrants,”
“must have been of a rather low social level”
(Asper 2009: 114), whereas the theoretical mathe-
maticians were “at home in the upper circles of
Athenian society” (123).
4. The language of both traditions was highly stan-
dardized and remote from oral discourse (Asper
2009: 119–20). Nonetheless, the texts of the practi-
cal tradition were accompanied by oral, personal
explanation—they presupposed a teacher and a
“live” situation. By contrast, the texts of the theoret-
ical tradition are seen by Asper as autonomous—
that is, constructed in such a way that they could,
and still can, be understood on their own (Asper
2009: 126).
Asper’s idea of distinction is an interesting twist on
G. E. R. Lloyd’s examination of competitive social prac-
tices in classical Athens and antiquity more generally
(e.g., Lloyd 1987), but not everything in his picture, al-
beit sophisticated and nuanced, is equally convincing.
He probably overemphasizes the extent to which the
language of practical mathematics was standardized,6
and there are other issues that I shall raise below. Let’s
assume for the moment, however, that Asper’s two-
cultures model is correct, and apply it to our example.
It would go something like this: At some point in the
very remote past, somewhere or inmore than one place,
somehow—possibly through repeated experience on
concrete cases—people became aware of P. Since then,
they have been both applying P in everyday measure-
ment situations, and teaching P through speciﬁc exam-
ples to the next generations, presumably so that they are
equipped in their turn to solve measurement problems.
At a certain point, possibly in classical Athens, having
honed their demonstrative skills through the exercise
of competitive rhetoric, a small group formulates P in
a general form, and constructs a proof of it. A discourse
is thus created for the purposes of social distinction,
according to which the general formulation of P is the
only true knowledge of P, and people who can partici-
pate in the language in which the proof is formulated
are the only truemathematicians. Themajority ofmath-
ematicians outside this small elite continue to do their
thing, same as it ever was, but ﬁnd themselves operating
within a practice that is now distinct from, and con-
strued as incompatible with, the ﬁrst one.
This could be described as a clash of ontologies, in
line with the theme of this volume, but, crucially, Asper
highlights the fact that despite social differences there
was a shared cultural substratum, and that the clashing
ontologies have been constructed rather than simply
being there or “emerging.” Even so, once the distinc-
tion has been made and become successful, thanks to
favorable historical circumstances, such as the need of
Hellenistic monarchs for cultural legitimation (which
led, for instance, to the compilation of Euclid’s Elements,
and to the patronage of Archimedes by the kings of Syr-
acuse), the two cultures appear, both to ancient observers
and to future generations, hypostasized, clearly distinct
in status and cultural capital. In other words, what were
in origin epistemic constructs can become ontologies at a
later stage, in a successful example of what Bruno Latour
and Steve Woolgar described as an “inscription”: a pro-
cess whereby an epistemic construction becomes the sci-
entiﬁc truth, and the scaffolding of its initial construction
is dismantled and erased (Latour and Woolgar 1979).
5. Asper: “Long and remarkably stable tradition . . . (but,
admittedly, may have changed along the way),” Babylo-
nian scribes “must have used essentially the same ac-
counting board,” “the tradition resurfaces” (2009: 109;
see also 112). Asper cites Høyrup, probably the most in-
ﬂuential “continuist” regarding the practical tradition’s
expanse across time and space.
6. Linguistic analyses of this type are not unproblematic:
for instance, they deﬁne “standardization” by contrast
with what they refer to as “oral discourse,” and yet in a
context like that of the classical or Hellenistic Greek
world, our knowledge of oral discourse ultimately derives
from written texts.
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Asper’s picture is, as I said, sophisticated and, for sev-
eral aspects, persuasive. Nonetheless, there are some
threads left hanging.
I. Despite the recurrence and persistence of certain
features, the practical tradition is arguably as sub-
ject to change and as context-dependent as any
other cultural and mathematical practice. To adapt
Angela Carter’s (1990) words about fairy tales,
“Who ﬁrst invented meatballs? In what country?
Is there a deﬁnitive recipe for potato soup? Think
in terms of the domestic arts. ‘This is how I make
potato soup’ ”; there is no mathematical Potato
Soup of the Folk, nor any solution to the problem
of measuring a ﬁeld that has simply been passed
down the generations. Even if we encounter the
same problem about right-angled triangles, with
the same set of numbers, in different cultural con-
texts, that may be how a particular person or group
“made potato soup”—we should question whether
it is legitimate to erase its speciﬁcity and just label it
as “yet another instantiation of Potato Soup.” The
latter of which is also a very Platonic thing to do.
II. Several of the authors in the theoretical tradition
also contributed to the practical tradition by en-
gaging—for instance, in the problem of measuring
the circle and producing numerical values for the
ratio between circumference and radius.7 Indeed,
III. Some mathematical texts or authors from antiq-
uity are hard to classify—for instance, Diophan-
tus or Ptolemy, or Archimedes’s Sand-reckoner.
In fact, many treatises on astronomy, optics, or
harmonics may be difﬁcult to unambiguously as-
cribe to one tradition to the exclusion of the other.
This would seem to imply that some mathemati-
cians—mostmathematicians?—were active in both
traditions, and that Asper’s social differentiation
as described at point 3 (above) needs revising.
Arguably, this went both ways—not only were
theoretical mathematicians occasionally “slum-
ming it” in the practical tradition but also practi-
cal mathematicians may have been aware of the
texts and practices of the theoretical tradition.
IV. While it is true that the practical tradition is
mostly transmitted through papyrus and the the-
oretical tradition mostly throughmanuscript (As-
per 2009: 109–10), there is theoretical mathemat-
ics on papyrus or ostrakon (speciﬁcally, material
that has been identiﬁed as Euclidean),8 and, equally,
there is practical mathematics transmitted through
manuscripts—for instance, the Corpus Agrimenso-
rum Romanorum or, as mentioned, the so-called
pseudo-Heronian material. In the rare cases where
such information is available, the archaeological
context for “practical”mathematics (including ar-
ithmetical tables) does not seem signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from the archaeological context of material
that one might expect to be associated with the
culture or status of theoretical mathematics, such
as classical Greek literature, or ofﬁcial documents
denoting an elevated place in society.9 Also, we
ﬁndGreek and “Egyptian”material (meaning both
material in demotic, and material pertaining to
“Egyptian culture,” such as temple texts) in the
same archaeological context. In other words, the
differentiationof theoreticalmathematics andprac-
tical mathematics along lines of social status or
cultural identity is not borne out by evidence ex-
ternal to our interpretation of the text.
V. There is the small matter of Hero of Alexandria’s
Metrica, to which we now turn.
Written around the second half of the ﬁrst century
CE, the Metrica’s potential to revolutionize our picture
of ancient Greek and Roman mathematics has yet to be
fully realized. Here is a representative passage (see Fig-
ure 2):
Let there be a right-angled triangle ABC, having the
right angle in correspondence of B and let the AB be
of 3 units, while BC is of 4 units. To ﬁnd the area of
the triangle and the hypotenuse.
Let the ABCD be completed. Because the area of
the rectangular parallelogram ABCD, as was proved
above, is 12, the triangle ABC is half of the parallelo-
gram ABCD, therefore the area of the triangle ABC
will be six. And because the angle at ABC is right,
and the squares on AB, BC are equal to the square
on AC, and the squares on AB, BC are of 25 units,
7. For example, Archimedes, Measurement of the circle 3;
see also other authors in Eutocius’s commentary on Ar-
chimedes’s treatise.
8. The most complete list is still in Fowler (1999).
9. See Cuomo (forthcoming) with further references.
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and the square on AC therefore will be of 25 units.
Therefore that side, the AC, is of 5 units.
The method is this. Having multiplied the 3 by the 4,
take their half. It makes 6. Of these the area of the tri-
angle. And the hypotenuse: having multiplied the 3 by
themselves and similarly having multiplied the 4 by
themselves, put them together. And they make 25. And
having taken the root of these, have the hypotenuse
of the triangle. (Hero, Metrica I.2; my translation)
The Metrica’s special position in the history of
Greek mathematics lies in its approach: measurement
is tackled both as a general problem, solved via a proof
applicable to all geometrical objects of a certain type,
and as a speciﬁc problem, solved by measuring a par-
ticular geometrical object of that type. Historians of
mathematics used to be dismissive. Van der Waerden
thought that it was:
A very childish little book. . . . Nothing but numerical
examples, without proofs. Just like a cuneiform text. . . .
There is no doubt in my mind that similar cookbooks
have always existed. . . . Occasionally something is
added, sometimes found by a real mathematician . . .
but usually the source is anonymous. Some of the nu-
merical examples in Heron are already found in cune-
iform texts. . . . It is next to impossible to prove their
dependence or to trace the road along which they were
transmitted. And, after all, it is not very important. It is
mankind’s really great thoughts that are of impor-
tance, not their dilution in popularizations and in col-
lections of problems with solutions. Let us rejoice in
the masterworks of Archimedes and of Apollonius
and not mourn the loss of numberless little arithmetic
books after the manner of Heron. (van der Waerden
1954: 277–78)
The idea that the Metrica has something non-Greek
(“cuneiform”) about it was echoed by Otto Neugebauer
in The exact sciences in antiquity:
As a particularly drastic example might be mentioned
the elementary geometry represented in the Hellenistic
period in writings which go under the name of Heron
of Alexandria (second half of the ﬁrst century AD).
These treatises on geometry were sometimes consid-
ered to be signs of the decline of Greek mathematics,
and this would indeed be the case if one had to con-
sider them as the descendants of the works of Archi-
medes or Apollonius. But such a comparison is unjust.
In view of our recently gained knowledge of Babylonian
texts, Heron’s geometry must be considered merely a
Hellenistic form of a general oriental tradition. (Neuge-
bauer 1957: 146)
More recently, the characterization has shifted to
what we could call “hybridity”: Metrica has been called
a blend (Fowler 1999: 9), a combination of elements
from several traditions (Tybjerg 2004: 31, 35), a mélange
of subgenres, linked to an “algorithmic” approach.10 To-
ward the conclusion of a nuanced analysis of Hero’smet-
rological work, which eschews strong commitment to
the “hybridity” thesis, Vitrac nonetheless suggests:
In any case, the Metrica does not raise from either of
the modalities that we have distinguished, because its
explicit aim is precisely to articulate the metrological
steps of a sort of algorithm on the one hand and the
outcomes of demonstrative geometry on the other,
so as to validate the former by means of the latter.
(Vitrac 2011: 14; my translation)
The implication here appears to be that demonstra-
tive geometry is viewed as epistemologically superior to
metrology, and thus able, in Hero’s project, to validate
it.11 I ﬁnd Karin Tybjerg’s analysis to be better bal-
anced: “In general, the techniques employed by Hero
show that it is not possible to maintain the notion that
Euclidean-Archimedean geometry was sealed off from
Figure 2: Diagram for Hero,Metrica I 2, author’s drawing.
10. Acerbi and Vitrac (2014: 41, 58), are also careful to point
out that theMetrica is not unique, but that it has obvious
similarities with other algorithmic—and speciﬁcally
metrological—texts, both from the Graeco-Roman tra-
dition and from other mathematical traditions. Their
metrological tradition is basically congruent with what
Asper terms the “practical tradition.”
11. Similar criticism appears in Tybjerg (2004: 39).
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the traditions of professional problems and calculation
techniques” (Tybjerg 2004: 34–35).
The debate around the the role of Hero’s Metrica
vis-à-vis the “two cultures” of Greek mathematics is
meaningful because it reveals underlying assumptions,
not only in the use of labels like “Greek” or “Oriental”
and the respective values they are made to carry but
also in the attempt at a resolution of what is perceived
as its singular cultural identity. The existence itself of
Hero’s Metrica is a potential threat to the idea of two
cultures, because rather than bridging them (Asper 2009:
127), it may be taken to collapse them. Conversely, Hero’s
Metrica may demand a more complex vocabulary of
identity, a model other than a binary one.
With that in mind, I would like to explore the poten-
tial fruitfulness of a couple of ideas borrowed from
anthropology and linguistics: the notion of situation-
speciﬁcity, or situated learning, as advanced by Jean
Lave, both as sole author and in joint authorship with
Etienne Wenger (Lave 1986, 1988; Lave and Wenger
1991); and the notion of code-switching, which is pri-
marily a linguistic notion, but has fruitfully been ap-
plied to issues of cultural identity and imperialism,
both metaphorically and more literally, given that lan-
guage was crucial for the articulation of identity in an-
cient Greece and Rome.12 I will also try to apply some
insights about identity and free spaces articulated by
Kostas Vlassopoulos (Vlassopoulos 2007, 2009, with ref-
erences to earlier bibliography).
Let’s start with situation-speciﬁcity. This is not an
entirely new concept for historians of science,13 but in
Lave’s work it stems from observations about mathe-
matical practice, which makes it particularly helpful,
and arguably relevant, for our historical case.
In observations of the mathematical behaviour of
late twentieth-century Californians, Lave found that
people who appeared to be mathematically incompe-
tent (or not very proﬁcient) in a school context, proved
to be mathematically proﬁcient when asked to deploy
the same mathematical knowledge (same in the sense
that P is the same across our two previous examples)
in a different, nonschool context, such as the super-
market or the home. Lave’s supermarket “experiments”
were in the vein of similar research conducted in differ-
ent countries and situations, from tailors in Liberia to
street kids selling goods at the market in Brazil.14 In
Lave’s own words: “The same people differ in their
arithmetic activities in different settings in ways that
challenge theoretical boundaries between activity and
its settings, between cognitive, bodily, and social forms
of activity, between information and value, between
problems and solutions” (Lave 1988: 3).
Given that school proﬁciency, or the lack thereof,
can often be mapped onto class, gender, and race, and
given that the observations about the situatedness of
mathematical knowledge have almost always involved
participants who are in someway disadvantaged in com-
parison to the stereotypically mathematically proﬁcient
white middle-class, college-educated man, situation-
speciﬁcity can be deployed as a powerful political state-
ment, even if Lave’s account itself is not overtly political.
Western-style school mathematics, or the “theoretical
tradition,” or “mental arithmetic” as opposed to, say, ﬁn-
ger calculation, are only some among many possible
mathematical “situations.” They just happen, for histor-
ical reasons that are often as well known as they are ul-
timately ignored, to have become institutionalized, to the
point where they stand in for “numeracy” or “mathemat-
ical knowledge” or “calculating skill” tout court, respec-
tively (Harouni 2015).
The advantage, in my view, of using the notion of
“situation” instead of “tradition,” “culture,” and even
“ontology,” is that “situations” are ﬁner grained and
more ﬂexible, and also better suited to exploring use
and practice, rather than “systems” (Johnstone 2011);
action rather than theory. Moreover, “situations” make
more room for unauthorized agency and interaction,
can be similar across time and space, but are also his-
torically localized, and they can be characterized in
terms of issues of access and power (which suits both
Lloyd’s competitive context, and Asper’s context of so-
cial distinction).
Next, consider the idea of code-switching, or a
speaker’s ability to alternate between two or more lan-
guages, depending on situation and context. It has long
been recognized that language was key to articulating
cultural identity in antiquity. At the same time, bilin-
gualism and code-switching have become useful meta-
phors to talk about cultural identities in antiquity. A
passage in the Dissoi Logoi, in the context of debating
12. I have drawn extensively on the following: Heller (1995);
Webster (2001); Cooley (2002); Adams (2003); Gardner-
Chloros (2005); Wallace-Hadrill (2008).
13. For example, Chemla (2012) is very much in tune with
it (without explicitly using the concept).
14. Examples include Ginsburg, Posner, and Russell (1981);
Carraher, Carraher, and Schliemann (1985); Lave (1986).
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the question whether one can teach and learn wisdom
and virtue, states:
And if someone is not convinced that we learn our
words, but rather that we are born knowing them, let
him gain knowledge from this: if someone sends a
child to Persia as soon as the child is born and has it
brought up there without ever hearing Greek sounds,
the child will speak Persian. If someone brings the
child from Persia to Greece, the child will speak Greek.
That is how we learn words, and we do not know who
it was who taught us. (Dissoi Logoi 6.12, Loeb tr.)
The facts that language crops up in the discussion,
and that a discussion about virtue implicates the differ-
ence between Greek and barbarian, are signiﬁcant here.
Examples could multiply: the notion of paideia, literary
education, often seen as the dominant cultural para-
digm of the elite in the Roman period, rested on strong
competence in the Greek language, and is a very good
example of the fact that, in Lave and Wenger’s words,
“learning involves the construction of identities” (Lave
and Wenger 1991: 53). It is also well known that code-
switching in antiquity could be about “the expression
of different types of identity” (Adams 2003: 302; cf. also
356–82, 413–15).
All this suits Metrica rather well. The text has been
seen as an instantiation of hybridity, but the problem
with that term is its passivity. To talk in terms of code-
switching, which is a more agent-centered concept, does
more justice to Hero’s very deliberate (“marked,” in
linguistic terms) combination of the reference frame
of axiomatico-deductive mathematics,15 and of calcu-
lations. The ability to speak more than one language
may still leave space for a distinction between “mother
tongue” and others, including pidgin languages, which
are recognizably “acquired,” and creolization (which
could be another way to describeMetrica), but the main
point is not competence—rather, it is the fact that
agents switch linguistic codes and indeed cultural iden-
tities, according to the context of performance and
communication (the situation).16
Situation-speciﬁcity thus creates a plausible frame-
work for the switching of codes, and supports the possi-
bility thatMetricamay not have been such a rare beast—
perhapsmultilingualism, mathematically speaking, was
not as exotic as we might think. Together, these two no-
tions approximate a better model than the two cultures,
for understanding mathematicians who “crossed bound-
aries” in either direction. Rather, the newmodel dissolves
the idea of crossing boundaries, thus making sense of
the fact that, as I mentioned above, whenever we are
able to reconstruct a more localized context for mathe-
matical knowledge, we are faced with “multilingualism.”
Similarly to situation-speciﬁcity, there are underly-
ing political connotations to code-switching. For a long
time, this way of “mixing things up” was associated with
incompetence, displacement, and subordination—a lin-
guistic phenomenon associated with the immigrant, the
insufﬁciently educated, and the geographically marginal.
And yet, the prime example of code-switching in classi-
cal antiquity is the member of the elite but also homo
novusCicero, whose usage ofGreek represents very com-
plex code-switching (Adams 2003: passim). Even today,
according to Penelope Gardner-Chloros, the perception
of code-switching, even on the part of many of the code-
switchers themselves, can be one of laziness, surprise,
and embarrassment, although she notes that “approval
of CS tends to coincide with a laid-back attitude towards
authority” (Gardner-Chloros 2005: 14–15).
Moreover, and brieﬂy, the idea of cultural identity
has been problematized by Vlassopoulos in a way that
is relevant to our purposes. While acknowledging the
existence of discourses advocating strong cultural iden-
tity differences (Greek v. barbarian, Athenian v. non-
Athenian, slave v. free), Vlassopoulos draws on abun-
dant ancient evidence to make the point, speciﬁc to
classical Athens in his work but in my view easily ex-
tendable to other ancient contexts, that identities were
confused, confusing, and subject to continuous negoti-
ation and renegotiation. He points out that, despite a
rhetoric of separation and distinction, there were many
15. See Tybjerg (2004) for a nuanced analysis.
16. I do not ﬁnd the notion of linguistic incompetence as a
reason for code-switching (see Adams 2003: 305–8) use-
ful in this context, for two reasons. First, code-switching
is here a way of talking about cultural identity, so that
the equivalent of incompetence would be the lack of au-
thority in self-deﬁnition, which I reject. Second, I take
Lave and Wenger’s (1991) notion of legitimate periph-
eral participation as a useful model of learning. On that
model, and particularly if code-switching is a way of
talking about knowledge practices, participation is al-
ways legitimate, and competence or lack of competence
are therefore not useful concepts. As well put by Gardner-
Chloros (2005: 18): “Code-switchers upset the notion of
performance errors by contravening and rewriting the
expected rules.”
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communal “free spaces” (the agora, the ergasterion
[workshop, ndr], the household, the harbor, the ship)
where people from across alleged cultural boundaries
met, interacted, and communicated. As Vlassopoulos
points out, at least in some cases those free spaces must
have involved literal as well as metaphorical multilin-
gualism and code-switching (Vlassopoulos 2007, 2009).
Thus, the notion of “tradition” or “culture” seems
compatible with a scenario where cultural identity is
relatively unproblematic, and as such susceptible to rel-
atively easy identiﬁcation (e.g., a certain piece of math-
ematics looks unmistakably Greek or, conversely, non-
Greek), subject to, at most, “mixing.” However, more
recent and self-reﬂective discourses, such as Vlassopou-
los’s, take it that cultural identity is always a construct,
and therefore always problematic; that identiﬁcation
could be, and was, contested, thus raising the question
of whom should be qualiﬁed to assign or deny a certain
cultural identity attribution or label, particularly if we
accept that it is possible for an individual to activate or
switch different identities at will, without asking for ex-
ternal authorization.17
In conclusion, what are the consequences of apply-
ing situation-speciﬁcity, code-switching, and “free-
space” cultural identity—in preference to “tradition”
or “culture,” in the sense in which they have been used
in the relevant literature—to the study of mathematical
practices in ancient Greek and Roman worlds? First of
all, “theoretical” and “practical” turn out to be not dif-
ferent cultures or different traditions but different situ-
ations. It is no longer enough to populate mathematical
practices with just minds at work, seen through the lens
of texts. Situated learning requires that we get a better
sense of the “nexus of relations between the mind at
work and the world in which it works.”18 That is com-
patible with Asper’s idea of a shared original substra-
tum, but it also allows for people unproblematically
to participate in more than one situation, and it does
not map social status or institutional status onto a cer-
tain way of doing mathematics, while leaving open the
possibility of mapping social or institutional status in
terms of the speciﬁc situation to which that person
would have had access. It leaves us open to the possibil-
ity of situations that mix things up a little, or a lot.
Situation-speciﬁcity is conducive to greater symme-
try. The situation-speciﬁcity of theoretical mathematics
is not essentially different from the situation-speciﬁcity
of practical mathematics. Consequently, they both have
a history, and the abstract, general quality of theoretical
mathematics does not rest on ontological grounds. On-
tologies are a feature of situations, but not the only fea-
ture. Indeed,
a theory of situated activity challenges the very mean-
ing of abstraction and/or generalization. . . . An impor-
tant point about such sequestering when it is institu-
tionalized is that it encourages a folk epistemology of
dichotomies, for instance, between “abstract” and “con-
crete” knowledge. These categories do not reside in the
world as distinct forms of knowledge, nor do they reﬂect
some putative hierarchy of forms of knowledge among
practitioners. Rather, they derive from the nature of the
new practice generated by sequestration. Abstraction in
this sense stems from the disconnectedness of a partic-
ular cultural practice. Participation in that practice is
neither more nor less abstract or concrete, experiential
or cerebral, than in any other. (Lave andWenger 1991:
37; see also 33–34, 104)
Second, even though the practices we are discuss-
ing are largely textual, shifting the focus to situation-
speciﬁcity and to code-switching
emphasizes the inherently socially negotiated character
of meaning and the interested, concerned character of
the thought and action of persons-in-activity. This
view also claims that learning, thinking, and knowing
are relations among people in activity in, with, and aris-
ing from the socially and culturally structured world.
(Lave and Wenger 1991: 50–51)
I think we should recognize the inevitability of per-
sonal, tacit knowledge even when all we have are texts,
and cast doubt over the possibility of truly autonomous
texts—even Archimedes ﬁrst learned mathematics
from some other person. Basic numeracy skills, which
are situation-speciﬁc and include a component of tacit,
interpersonal knowledge, are the sine qua non of math-
ematical knowledge. In this sense, again, Asper is right.
17. For a modern but relevant parallel, witness the recent
discussions around LGBT, trans- and cis-gender, and
gender identity.
18. Lave: “These studies converge towards a view that math
‘activity’ (to propose a term for a distributed form of
cognition) takes form differently in different situations.
The speciﬁcity of arithmetic practice wthin a situation,
and discontinuities between situations, constitute a pro-
visional basis for pursuing explanations of cognition as
a nexus of relations between the mind at work and the
world in which it works” (1988: 1).
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Third, especially when marked, code-switching em-
phasizes self-determination and situation-speciﬁc agency.
The authority to ascribe identity thus shifts from an ex-
ternal classiﬁcation of people and mathematical activi-
ties (including at the hands of modern historians), to
self-deﬁnition or, in the absence of explicit statements,
the presumption of self-deﬁnition. The mathematicians
active both within the theoretical tradition and the prac-
tical tradition, the big authors and the anonymous ones,
and others involved in mathematical practices whomay
have not produced any texts, under this model ought to
be all recognized as agents. The idea that we can separate
out “real” mathematicians from those who never wrote
a text, and speciﬁcally a text proving a theorem, is, in
my view, unacceptably arbitrary (pace Netz 2002). You
could see this as an extreme version of preferring actors’
to observers’ categories, which is again very much one
of Lloyd’s seminal contributions to the history of ancient
science.
A perspective that frames things in terms of situation-
speciﬁcity rather than culture or tradition recognizes that
there are power relationships to do with mathematical
practices and mathematical knowledge, but does not at-
tribute power exclusively to the group or tradition that
happen to be more similar to modern mathematics, or
tomodern scholars. Monica Heller has drawn on (again)
Pierre Bourdieu to argue that code-switching can be used
to gain entry to groups with cultural capital. Using the
metaphor of a game with rules,
speciﬁc groups set the rules of the game by which re-
sources can be distributed. . . . It is necessary to display
appropriate linguistic and cultural knowledge in order
to gain access to the game, and playing it well requires
in turn mastery of the kinds of linguistic and cultural
knowledge which constitute its rules. Buying into the
game means buying into the rules, it means accepting
them as routine, as normal, indeed as universal, rather
than as conventions set up by dominant groups in or-
der to place themselves in the privileged position of
regulating access to the resources they control. (Heller
1995: 160)
And yet, Heller does not allow for participants to
change the game, deliberately in an act of subversion,
or less deliberately by not playing the gamewell. She sur-
renders control of the game to the already-established
participants, not simply in terms of setting or abiding
by the rules but also in terms of who should access
the game, and how well they are playing. Transferring
this to cultural identity, if both situated learning and
code-switching are ways to reclaim and construct—
to own—cultural identities, then Lave and Wenger,
compared to Heller, reafﬁrm the signiﬁcance of self-
deﬁnition over authorization by other parties. Trans-
ferred to Hero, this means that we, historians, ought
to take seriously his claim to belong to the same tradi-
tion as Eudoxus and Archimedes, while recognizing it
as an operation of code-switching. Transferred to wider
discourses about cultural capital and learning in the
ancient Greek and Roman worlds, this creates an al-
ternative, and possibly a subversion, to the concept of
paideia, which can be easily recognized as a Bourdieu-
type social-distinction linguistic and cultural game.
This would seem to work particularly well for ancient
Greece and Rome because, while there were political,
social, and economic hierarchies and inequalities, cul-
ture was not deeply institutionalized, and for many
forms of knowledge there was, as Lloyd has repeatedly
demonstrated, a marketplace.
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